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Educating for Virtue Across Multiple Cultural
and Religious Contexts: On the Problem of Commensurability

Journal of Contemporary Research in Education
1(3) 114-129

Mark Ortwein
The University of Mississippi
Abstract
This aim of this paper is to explore the concept of intellectual and moral virtue across
cultural, religious, and philosophical points of view—with special attention to the role of education
in the formation of virtue. The central ambition of this paper is to determine if virtue is a concept
that transcends cultural contexts and, should it do so, to what extent? It is shown that certain
ubiquitous virtuous character traits are valued across cultural lines, and that similar understandings
of virtue emerge in almost all cultural and religious contexts. Despite this, it also clear that virtue
functions differently across cultural and religious contexts, and that the expression of virtue may
itself look very different. This is demonstrated through various religious texts, works of
philosophy, and traditional proverbs from several important traditions: Chinese, South Asian, Greek
philosophy, and African moral theory. I conclude with a discussion of challenges facing virtuebased theories.

Introduction
The virtues are by no means a new topic
in moral and character education—an
understatement to be sure. Indeed the topic
moral virtue and more recently, intellectual
virtue, continues to interest scholars in many
disciplines. Much of this renewed interest can be
traced back to Elizabeth Anscombe’s (1957)
seminal article, “Modern Moral Philosophy,”
wherein she urges a break from Kantian and
Utilitarian ethics, and a return to classical Greek
moral theory rooted in virtue. Shortly thereafter
the philosophical field of virtue ethics was born.
A few decades later, responding to an intractable
epistemological conundrum put forth by
Edmond Gettier (1963), Ernest Sosa (1980)
published a now classic article entitled, “The
Raft and Pyramid: Coherence versus
Foundationalism.” Therein he levied his
considerable philosophical prowess to put forth
a new approach to epistemology—one
employing virtue as a powerful epistemological
concept. Others found his approach appealing,
and soon scholars like Loraine Code (1987),
James Montmarquet (1993), and Linda
Zagzebski (1996) were discovering novel ways
to understand the relationship between belief
formation and intellectual virtue. This
movement, now called virtue epistemology,

occupies a central place in the canon of
contemporary work in the theory of knowledge.
What is striking in both cases—virtue
ethics and virtue epistemology—is how versatile
and powerful the concepts of moral and
intellectual virtue are. This prompted three
questions: (1) how do other cultures understand
virtue; (2) to what extent do these conceptions
converge and diverge; and (3) to what extent
will multiple conceptions of virtue result in
incommensurability? Christopher Peterson and
Martin E. P. Seligman (2004) faced similar
worries during the early stages of their largescale empirical and philosophically grounded
study of virtue in multiple cultural contexts.
They too confronted the possibility that virtues
are incommensurate across cultural lines:
When we undertook our project, we
started by creating our own list. With
little modesty, we asserted that our list
included strengths and virtues valued in
all contemporary cultures around the
world. But when we showed our list to
colleagues, we encountered the frequent
objection that there are no strengths and
virtues valued across all cultures.
Indeed, we were told that the subcultural
variations along regional,
socioeconomic, religious, and ethnic
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lines in just the contemporary United
States precluded a universal list even for
the here and now. We took these
criticisms seriously and worried about
reifying characteristics valued only at
the turn of the new century by uppermiddle-class European American
academics (p. 33).

Virtue in Cultural Context
According to Ninian Smart (1999), three
world regions have been particularly influential
in the history of religion and ideas—China
(Taoism and Confucianism), South Asia
(Buddhism and Hinduism), and the West (Greek
philosophy, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) (p.
2). I follow Smart’s lead, but add African culture
because of its historical and cultural richness. I
survey how virtues are understood and function
within several of these philosophical and
religious traditions. This discussion, while
regrettably brief, provides sufficient ground for
making some general observations.

It is fair to assume, I believe, that many scholars
of comparative education will express similar
uncertainties about this project. After all, we live
in the age of postmodernity—an age that casts
doubt on the project of categorization. As such, I
have undertaken this project with great caution
and intellectual humility.

Chinese Virtue – Confucianism
This aim of this paper is to explore the
concept of intellectual and moral virtue across
cultural, religious, and philosophical points of
view—with special attention to the role of
education in the formation of virtue. The central
ambition of this paper is to determine if virtue is
a concept that transcends cultural contexts and,
should it do so, to what extent? Notably, the
perspectives I cover are deeply complex, and
only cursory coverage can be given of each. For
the sake of clarity, then, when speaking of the
Yoruba and Akan peoples, I am largely
concerned with role of virtue in their cultural
practices; my discussion of Confucianism and
Buddhism draws mainly from religious texts and
practices, and Greek notions of virtue
(unsurprisingly) are drawn largely from
philosophical sources. It is shown that certain
ubiquitous virtuous character traits are valued
across cultural lines, and that similar
understandings of virtue emerge in almost all
cultural and religious contexts. Despite this, it
also clear that virtue functions differently across
cultural and religious contexts, and that the
expression of virtue may itself look very
different. This is demonstrated through various
religious texts, works of philosophy, and
traditional proverbs from several very important
traditions: Chinese, South Asian, Greek
philosophy, and African moral theory. I
conclude with a discussion of challenges facing
virtue-based theories.

Confucianism was conceived against a
backdrop of political turmoil. The Zhou Dynasty
(1040? – 256 B. C. E.) had recently disintegrated
and the king’s authority was severely
diminished. What power remained was
concentrated in the hands of a number of
dukedoms that imposed their own taxes, raised
their own armies, and often waged war on each
other—and people suffered. Bryan W. Van
Norden (2007) offers the following intriguing
quote from a leading minister of Jin:
Our ruler has here 4,000 chariots of war.
Even if he acts contrary to the Way, it is
still necessary to fear him; if he, beyond
that, is acting in accordance with the
Way, who can prove his opponent? An
ox may be meager; but if it fall upon a
pig, would you not fear the pig would
die? … If we lead on the multitudes of
Jin, using also the forces of the other
states? … if we come thus to punish Lu
for its offenses … what can we seek that
we shall not get (p. 33)?
Although the minister was cognizant of the Way
(Dao)—the principles that govern the meditative
life—other concerns clearly trumped it. In fact,
brute reality showed that leaders depended more
upon force and cunning strategy for prosperity
than adherence to the Way. This sort of thinking
was out of tune with the general regard ordinary
people had for the Way. These person looked to
a distant past when “Heaven” granted Kings
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In particular, he believed that healthy social
relationships were essential for a prosperous
society. To this end, he advanced two especially
important theses: Persons can teach and learn
goodness, and a peaceful society is only possible
when it is ruled by wisdom (Yao, 2000, p. 26).
From these theses, Confucius eventually
developed his four key ideas—those that would
eventually become the foundation for the
Confucian tradition. First, Confucius continued
to promote dao, which literally translates as
“path,” “road,” or “way.” Following dao was the
basis for moral and peaceful social conditions.
Second, Confucius promoted rituals (li), which
were thought to be instrumental for the
cultivation of virtue, and a means of educating
persons in the ways of ru. Third, he stressed the
importance of humaneness (ren). Those who
practiced ren would demonstrate a concern for
the wellbeing of others and an avoidance of selfaggrandizement. And, fourth, Confucius
promoted general virtue (dé). Confucian virtue
was understood as a deeply held moral authority
that granted persons power to act righteously.
Confucius was especially concerned with the
cultivation of dé among the aristocracy who
were ultimately responsible for the prosperity of
society (Yao, p. 26). Taken together these four
components roughly describe the tenets of
Confucianism. Of course, generations of
scholars and religious leaders have expanded
and transformed classical Confucianism. In the
following section, I focus largely on primary
sources—the works of Confucius themselves
and the five virtues they advance.

power and success based on their possession of
dé (virtue) and their respect of the Way. This
bifurcation generated deep social tension.
It was this chaos into which Confucius
was born. The son of a once prosperous family,
he made the study and teaching of the old
traditions his life’s work. Needless to say, his
teaching took root. Confucianism is undoubtedly
the most instrumental system of thought to
emerge from China. According to Norden
(2007), Confucius “provided the intellectual
background against which all later thinkers
react, and he started a movement that continues
to be socially and philosophically influential
more than two thousand years later” (p. 65).
Confucianism’s influence soon spread out across
East Asian and eventually spanned continents.
However, Confucianism is a misleading term.
Confucius did not “invent” a brand new religion
or system of thought. Rather he expanded on a
centuries-old Chinese tradition. Xinzhong Yao
(2000) explains:
It is true that as a distinctive ‘school’
Confucianism began with Confucius. It
was Confucius who explored deeply and
elaborated extensively on the basic
principles of what was to become
Confucianism, and it was Confucius and
his disciples who succeeded in
transmitting and trans- forming their
ancient culture. But it would go too far
to suggest that Confucianism was
‘created’ solely by Confucius and
Confucianism was sustained exclusively
by the faith in Confucius. In this sense,
the word ‘Confucianism’ is a misnomer
for the tradition that is normally referred
to as ru jia, ru jiao, ru xue or simply as
ru in China and other East Asian
countries (p. 17).

The central virtue and one of the guiding
principles for Confucius is ren. Ren functions as
a kind of moral attitude and is comprised of
various “building block” virtues. When these
blocks are fitted together a person will display
what Confucius calls “humanity.” This is
compassionate humanity (a concerned regard for
the dignity of humans) and is central to the
Confucius’ social philosophy. The person who
possesses ren is "a man [sic] who is strong,
resolute, simple, and slow to speak is near to
humanity" (Confucius, 2010, bk. 1 chap. 14). He
seems to suggest that rashness and
loquaciousness impede one’s ability to
understand the human condition. As noted,

Nevertheless, Confucius’ role was crucial. In
virtue of clearly articulating the central tenets of
ru, and doing so in a compelling and clear way,
Confucius revitalized the tradition. What, then,
did he have to say?
Confucius was primarily concerned with
humans and the principles that shaped humanity.
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one step forward, arguing that a love of learning
is requisite for many of the virtues.

however, ren is made up of several other virtues
(dé). These are described in the analects:
Zizhang asked about ren. The Master
aid, “He who can enact five things in the
world is ren.” When asked for details, he
went on, “Reverence, tolerance,
trustworthiness, quickness, and
generosity. He is reverent, hence he
receives no insults; he is tolerant, hence
he gains the multitudes; he is
trustworthy, hence others entrust him
with responsibilities; he is quick, hence
he has accomplishments; he is generous,
hence he is capable of being placed in
charge of others (Confucius, 2010, bk.
17 chap. 6).

If, you love ren, but you do not love
learning, the flaw is ignorance. If you
love knowledge but you do not love
learning, the flaw is unruliness. If you
love faithfulness but do not love
learning, the flaw is harming others. If
you love straightforwardness but you do
not love learning, the flaw is
offensiveness. If you love valor but you
do not love learning, the flaw is causing
chaos. If you love incorruptibility but
you do not love learning, the flaw is
recklessness (Confucius, 2010, bk. 17,
chap. 8).

These virtues work together and are dependent
on each other. One’s generosity should be
characterized by earnestness; one’s truthfulness
prompts diligence, and so forth. Confucius never
talks about the virtues in isolation. Virtue
epistemologists have noted this interrelationship
between virtues although the issue is a “thorny”
one (Zagzebski, 1996, p. 156). Finally,
according to Lee Rainey (2010), the moral
virtues (dé) culminating in (ren) are expressed
via ritual (li) (pp. 34-35). In fact, the cultivation
of virtue is directly tied to ritual and education.

The desire to learn—that is, to take an active
hand in acquiring new understanding—plays an
important role for Confucius. Students who train
their minds have the tools available to achieve
positive ethical outcomes; they have the
necessary know-how and know-that to exercise
virtue. Moreover, learning itself refines and
strengthens these virtues. Without learning,
however, the impulse to behave virtuously may
never obtain or (worse still) may result in
vicious behavior. There is another important
point to be made: “love of knowledge” is also an
intellectual virtue—one that plays a very
important role in the acquisition of knowledge
and understanding. Robert C. Roberts and W.
Jay Wood (2007), for example, argue that the
love of knowledge is a central epistemic virtue.
Those who love knowledge are prone toward
fact checking, persistence, and openmindedness. In short, those who love learning
also love knowledge (pp. 153-182).

Education: The Cultivation of Virtue
through Ritual and Self-Reflection
Confucians believe that virtues are
acquired through cultivation and education,
and/or some mixture of both. “Its chief aim is to
educate the learner to be fully human and to
become a qualified member of the community of
trust, and its primary approach is to enhance
self-cultivation and develop students’
capabilities of fulfilling their responsibilities for
themselves, for their families and for society at
large” (Yao, 2000, p. 283). The goal of
Confucian education (which is true of many
cultures) is ultimately tied to the social
prosperity of the community. Confucius (2010)
writes, “Cultivate yourself to bring comfort to
the people” (bk. 14, chap. 42). Learning begins
with oneself but extends to others. He takes this

Finally, I wish to note a few important
features of traditional Confucian education—
features that putatively nurture the
aforementioned virtues. Educators in the
Confucian tradition stress deep reflection, which
involves intense study and careful analysis of the
subject matter. The ultimate goal of this
educational activity—at least on the traditional
account—is the perfection of the person. Quite
contrary to the Christian view of “original sin”
and essential wickedness of human nature,
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The founder of Buddhism, Siddhārtha
Gautama (500? – 350? B.C.E.) was born and
taught near the Ganges River in Northeastern
India. However, the historical facts about his life
remain contested. Most accounts, though, assert
that he was born into a wealthy family and with
the prospect of hold power. Michael Carrithers
(1983) offers the following sketch:

Confucius held that persons were fundamentally
good. Education, then, provided a way to move
toward this perfection. Chinese students have
amassed a well-deserved (almost stereo typical)
reputation for being extremely diligent and
hardworking. This might be attributable to the
philosophical (and educational) foundation laid
by Confucius and his followers. The very first
lines of the Analects illustrate how important
study was to Confucius: “The Master said: To
study and at due times practice what one has
studied, is this not a pleasure?” For Confucians,
education is a lifelong process of self-cultivation
that emphasizes strength of will and
determination. Timothy Bergen (1995) explains
that Chinese emphases on “perfectibility,
learning, rationality, effort, and will-power” are
closely related to one another in Confucian
literature, and that “this fact sheds light upon
how Eastern learners view education and
explains why effort is seen as important in the
process of human perfectibility” (p. 45). In the
language of virtue: Chinese educational culture
values diligence and steadfastness with respect
to learning.

The Buddha was born the son of a king,
and so grew up with wealth, pleasure
and the prospect of power, all goods
commonly desired by human beings. As
he reached manhood, however, he was
confronted with a sick man, an old man
and a corpse. He had lived a sheltered
life, and these affected him profoundly,
for he realized that no wealth or power
could prevent him too from
experiencing illness, old age and death.
He also saw a wandering ascetic, bent
on escaping these sufferings. Reflecting
on what he had seen, he reached the first
great turning-point of his life: against
the wishes of his family he renounced
home, wife, child and position to
become a homeless wanderer, seeking
release from this apparently inevitable
pain (p. 2).

South Asian Virtue – Buddhism
Buddhism is among the largest and most
influential religions in the world. Its primary
concentration is in the region of South Asia,
which includes India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Burma. Leslie
Alldritt (2005) estimates that there are
approximately 360 million Buddhists in the
world, making it the third largest religion in the
world after Christianity and Islam (p. 4). It has
been estimated that over half of the world’s
population lives in areas significantly influenced
by Buddhism (Harvey, 1990, p. 1). Numerous
varieties of Buddhism exist, although three
broad schools are dominate: the Southern variety
where Theravada Buddhism is prevalent, the
Eastern version which mixes Chinese religious
tradition with Buddhism, and the Northern
variety found in Tibetan culture—the modern
inheritors of ancient Indian Buddhism (Harvey,
1990, p. 4). The following analysis draws from
the sacred canons of each of these schools with
the intention of providing a general account of
Buddhist understandings of virtue.

Despite Carrithers own admission that his
account is only roughly true, it nevertheless
explains an important feature of the Buddhist
religion. The Buddha’s path to enlightenment
originated in his confrontation with the existence
of pain and suffering. Carrithers goes on to
describe how the Buddha began his spiritual
journey by practicing meditation and selfmortification. These proved ineffective until one
day he determined to quietly reflect upon the
human plight. From this tranquil contemplation
he achieved an awakening—solving the
“enigma” of suffering. For the next forty-five
years he spread his message of enlightenment,
and a world religion was born ( p. 3).
To grasp how Buddhists understand the
concept virtue, it is necessary to cover the basic
teaching of Buddhism. According to Stephen
Laumakis (2008), the most important concept in
all Buddhist thought is the notion that who we
118
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suffering when it is unrequited. The third Noble
truth states that the cessation of these causes of
dukkha is possible. Finally, the fourth Noble
Truth prescribes the Way to overcome dukkha—
the Eightfold Path (Laumakis, 2008, pp. 52-60).

are is product of our thinking. Just as the body is
shaped by food and exercise (or lack thereof), so
too can we “maintain, shape, transform, and
indeed, strengthen” our minds’ “powers by
meditative practices and exercises” (p. 40). To
control the mind and thus perception is the goal
of Buddhist religious experience. Bearing this
insight in mind, let us briefly consider the tenets
and practices of Buddhism as manifest in the
Middle Way, Four Noble Truths, and Eightfold
Path.

The specifics of the Buddha’s Middle
Way are laid out in the Eightfold path. These
steps are (Olson, 2005, p. 54):
Right View or Understanding
Right Thought or Purpose

The Three Teachings

Right Speech

The Buddha taught that a way between
extreme asceticism and hedonism existed—what
came to be known as the Middle Way. The
Buddha discovered that self-denial and
mortification produced debilitating emotional
and physical suffering, and failed to live up to its
promises. While, on the other hand, hedonistic
enjoyment of life’s pleasures failed to fulfill his
desire for peace, worldly pleasure was too
fleeting to bring lasting joy. The Middle Way,
however, “gives rise to vision, which gives rise
to knowledge, which leads to peace, to direct
knowledge, to enlightenment…” (Laumakis,
2008, p. 47). Metaphysically, the implications of
the Middle Way are that human souls are not
fixed and eternal, nor are they destined for
ultimate annihilation. Instead, they are
annatta—lacking a fixed self (Laumakis, p.
270). Epistemologically, the Middle Way
suggests cautious path between naïve certainty
and total skepticism about our beliefs.

Right Behavior
Right Livelihood
Right Effort
Right Mindfulness
Right Concentration
The term “path” suggests that one takes
consecutive and linear steps toward
enlightenment. This is a misunderstanding as
these steps occur simultaneously. Moreover, the
word “right” indicates that one correctly
perceives the true state of affairs or reality.
These steps are also divisible into three main
categories: Wisdom, Meditation, and Moral
Action. The first category—Wisdom—indicates
that one grasps the Four Noble Truths and their
implications for life. “This is the greatest
wisdom that one can achieve in this life. These
are skillful, useful, and beneficial views. If you
attain this wisdom, you are liberated from the
cycle of pain and sorrow” (Olson, p. 55).
Grasping this Wisdom recommends taking steps
toward addressing the existence of dukkha.
Meditation, the second category, explicates this
massive mental struggle to free the mind of evil
states. Controlling the mind and cultivating
strength of will are essential because the mind
defaults to craving and grasping for things that
lead to suffering. The final category—Moral
Action—involves our conduct in speech,
behavior, and livelihood. Here Buddhists believe
that the reduction of dukkha depends upon our
willingness resist participating in the causal

The Four Noble Truths capture the basic
teachings of the Buddha and are modeled on
Indian medical science: confirming that patient
is sick, diagnosing the sickness, prescribing
treatment, and implementing the cure. The
Truths follow this pattern. The first noble truth
simply states that dukkha (suffering and pain)
exists—both existential and physical dukkha.
This is the starting point of the Buddha’s
thought. The second Noble Truth is more
complex. It states that the causes of dukkha are
linked in a causal chain that begins with
“contact” with the world, others, and ourselves.
This contact produces sensation, which in turn
producing craving, and craving produces
119
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oneself in these persons shoes, and to be filled
with despair.

chain of suffering. Put differently, when we
resist repaying an evil with another evil we stop
the chain reaction that promulgates further
suffering. This final category gets us closer to a
Buddhist theory of virtue.

To become emotionally identified with
her would be like a person without any
ability to swim jumping into a lake to
save a drowning child, which would
result in a double drowning. It is
necessary for a compassionate person to
be cool-headed and emotionally selfcontrolled, a posture similar to that of a
medical doctor analyzing a patient and
prescribing a remedy in a detached
manner—which does not mean a coldhearted, uncaring way. The Buddhist
goal is to strive for the spontaneous
exercise of compassion (Olson, 2005, p.
69).

Buddhism and Virtue
Three steps on the Eightfold Path deal
explicitly with moral action. It is not surprising
that Buddhists have written extensively on moral
character. According to Damien Keown (2005),
“There is more to the Buddhist moral life than
following rules. Rules must not only be
followed, but followed for the right reasons and
with the correct motivation. It is here that the
role of the virtues becomes important.” He goes
on to claim that the precepts (rules) and virtues
are two sides of the same coin. Precepts are
essentially “a list of things a virtuous person
would never do” (p. 12). Like many other
religious traditions, Buddhist virtues are
supposed to be habituated so that they come
forth naturally from a person’s character. This
corresponds with Zagzebski’s (1996)
observations about the motivational component
of intellectual and moral virtues—the view that
they impel us to act and think in particular ways
(p. 167). Likewise, the virtues counteract their
dukkha producing opposites—klesas (what we
call vices in the West). In other words, those
who are virtuous are less prone toward
generating more suffering in the world.

Thus the monk has learned to control his mind.
He understands (insight) the situation and feels
appropriate amounts of compassion and
generosity. He also understands that his
ministrations—while good and noble—will
make only a small difference. And he
perseveres; he returns to that ally each day, all
the while refusing to succumb to dukkha.
Education: Obtaining Virtue through the
Five Precepts
Virtue is taught via the Five Precepts
that lay Buddhists are encouraged to follow in
both the Mahayana and Theravada traditions.
These include a respect for life, avoidance of
theft, abstinence from sexual misconduct,
avoidance of untruthfulness, and avoidance of
drunkenness. The precepts “are meant to be
followed by Buddhists at all times, the object
being to establish a habit-formation of virtuous
and restrained conduct, in opposition to the
unwholesome tendencies of greed, hatred, and
delusion….” (Story, 2009, para. 7). Living by
these principles not only encourages self-control
and moral behavior, but also places a person in a
positive—habit forming—state of mind that
affects deep change. Helmut Klar (2011) offers
several methods for inculcating the Five
Precepts into a child’s education. First, he notes
that imitation (of parents and teachers) is of
central importance. When parents take their

Perhaps the most influential list of
virtues was composed in the Mahayana tradition.
In this tradition, the bodhisattva (an enlightened
person or being) practices six core virtues—
referred to as the paramita or Six Perfections.
These include generosity, morality, patience,
perseverance, meditation, and insight (Keown,
2005, p. 17). However, earlier it was noted that
followers of the Buddha must struggle to avoid
negative thinking. This fact directly affects the
way that such virtues are practiced. Suppose an
enlightened Buddhist monk decides to minister
to the needs of homeless people. He discovers an
alley where the homeless are living in cardboard
boxes. They are dirty, underfed, and sickly. A
natural human response would to be to place
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some key concepts that emerge from Greek
philosophy and contemporary virtue ethics.

dharmic responsibilities seriously, and live those
convictions out, children will imitate them. Klar
also encourages parents to celebrate Buddhism
with their children. This can be done by keeping
images of the Buddha in the home, and
celebrating festival days. Finally, he notes the
importance of reading and discussing Buddhist
texts with children, especially the Five Precepts
(pp. 2-6). Taken together, such activities are
foundations for “learning by heart”—that is,
fostering a deep regard and love of Buddhism
from a very early age.

The two key concepts that preoccupied
ancient Greek moral theory were virtue (arête)
and happiness (eudaimonia). Prior to Plato and
Aristotle, however, the two concepts were nearly
synonymous. “[Virtue] amounts, roughly, to
success in life, where such success is measured
largely if not entirely in external terms—in the
extent to which one has acquired the typically
recognized good things in life: wealth, power,
friends, and the like” (Meyer, 2008, pp. 3-4).
The distinction between virtue and happiness on
this account is blurry. Virtue is understood
almost exclusively by its external manifestation,
e.g., one is virtuous when one is obviously
successful. In Plato and Aristotle, however,
virtue is redefined as an internal characteristic or
trait (Meyer, p. 4). One might act courageously,
for example, but one is courageous only insofar
as courage is a deeply engrained character trait.

Cultivation of virtue is integral to
following the Middle Way of the Buddha, and
thus assumes privileged place in Buddhist
monastic education. Future monks are taught the
necessity of cultivating inward virtues in both
ritual-based education and their philosophical
training. George B. J. Dryfuss (2003), a
Westerner who studied in the Dalai Lama’s
temple for 15 years, describes several ways this
is done. First, he points out that newly arrived
monks are immersed in rigorous ritual life. New
monks, for example, are encouraged to recite
texts with specific and highly precise inflection.
This is thought to preserve textual meaning, but
it is also thought to cultivate the virtues of
conscientiousness and carefulness (pp. 86-87).
If monks decide to pursue scholarship in the
monastery, their training regimen intensifies
significantly. They continue to memorize large
portions of text (largely philosophical texts) but
add to this education training in debate—the
primary method of teaching for many monastic
teachers. The central goal of which is to produce
perspicuity of thought and critical reasoning
skills. As noted earlier, however, the skills (or
virtues) do not operate in isolation from other
virtues. The monk, whose thoughts penetrate
truth, is one whose character is deeply virtuous
(Dryfuss, p. 170).

Aristotle is probably the most influential
Greek philosopher to articulate a concept of
virtue. He begins by noting that our actions
generally have a goal (telos)—a reason for
having done them. “Every skill and every
inquiry, and similarly every action and rational
choice, is thought to aim at some good”
(Aristotle, 2004, p. 3). Indeed, if our actions
lacked some sort of goal they would be
essentially meaningless. Aristotle also
distinguishes between to forms of tele: there are
goals that facilitate achieving other goals, and
there are goals that we pursue for their own
sake. Consider the act of making cookies. There
are a whole series of steps I must take in order to
make (and eat) a batch of cookies. I have to run
to the market and purchase the ingredients,
prepare the batter, kneed the dough, pre-heat the
oven, and so forth. Each of these steps is a
telos—but each points toward a greater telos: to
enjoy a batch of fresh cookies. This greater
telos—enjoying cookies—explains the steps I
took along the way. “The ubiquitous human
phenomenon of doing things for reasons,
therefore, depends on there being at least one
thing we pursue for its own sake” (Meyer, 2008,
p. 52). Of course, there are many things we
pursue for their own sake—friends, lovers,

Greek Philosophy
Virtue has a long history in Western
(European) thought—particularly through the
influence of Greek philosophy and
Christianity—and one could fill several volumes
tracing its extensive influence. Instead, I provide
a very rough sketch of virtue by highlighting
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Second, the nature of reason is tied to
Aristotle’s understanding of the bipartite soul.
Briefly, the soul is divisible into rational and
non-rational parts (Aristotle, 2004, pp. 103-104).
The rational segment is the source of the
intellectual virtues—the chief of which is
practical wisdom. It is less obvious how the nonrational part of the soul relates to reason. Once
more a division is created—this time into a part
concerned with things like nutrition, but also a
part that has “more in common with reason, and
is capable both of opposing it (in the case of a
weak- willed person, for instance) and of
obeying it. The virtues of this second sub-part
are the virtues of character: courage, generosity,
and so on” (Crisp, 2004, p. xiv). Thus, excellent
(virtuous) reasoning is tied to both virtues of
character and intellectual virtues. As a
consequence, those who are morally and
intellectually virtuous experience eudaimonia.

children, prosperity, pleasure, and so on. But, as
Aristotle notes, “we choose them also for the
sake of happiness, on the assumption that
through them we shall live a life of happiness;
whereas happiness no one chooses for the sake
of any of these nor indeed for the sake of
anything else” (p. 3). In short, for Aristotle
happiness is the ultimate good and the telos for
which we should all strive.
What role do virtues like courage,
honesty, and practical wisdom play in the
acquisition of happiness? To address this
question, two points need to be clarified. First,
Aristotle tells us that our basic function—that
which makes us distinctly human—is our
capacity to reason. Roger Crisp (2004) offers an
interesting and helpful analogy. “It is worth
remembering that in Greek a horse that ran fast
could be said to have a ‘virtue’ or excellence, in
so far as it performed well its characteristic
activity” (p. xiv). A horse has a virtue when it
performs well in one of its basic functions.
Many take Aristotle to be endorsing what has
come to be known as the “function argument,
which takes the following form (Meyer, 2008, p.
63):

Education: Cultivating Virtue through
Education and Habituation
How, then, are the (moral and
intellectual) virtues acquired? In the first place,
Aristotle (2004) thinks they are acquired through
different and separate means: “intellectual virtue
owes its origin and development mainly to
teaching, for which reason its attainment
requires experience and time; virtue of character
(ēthos) is a result of habituation (ethos), for
which reason it has acquired its name through a
small variation on ‘ethos’” (p. 23). Thus
Aristotle’s virtues are acquired in two ways—
through teaching (intellectual virtues) and
habituation (moral virtues). Let us consider
intellectual virtues first.

1. Happiness is “doing well.”
2. Doing well means performing our
human function well.
3. Our human function is reasoning.
4. Therefore, happiness consists in
using our reason well.
5. Therefore, happiness is activity of
excellence of reason.

Aristotle distinguishes between two
kinds of intellectual virtue: the contemplative
and the calculative. According to Dunne (1999),
contemplative virtues are learned deductively—
that is, one starts with the general and moves
toward the specific (pp. 49-63). These virtues
include episteme (scientific knowledge), nous
(intuitive reason), and Sophia (philosophical
wisdom). Episteme or “scientific knowledge”
provides a good example. One can (putatively)
only acquire this virtue deductively—that is, by
listening to descriptions, considering

When persons reason well—the basic function—
they do so because they exercise virtue. Nafsika
Athanassoulis (2011) elaborates: “If the function
of man [sic] is reason, then the good man is the
man who reasons well. This is the life of
excellence or of eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is the
life of virtue—activity in accordance with
reason, man’s highest function” (para. 32).Thus
happiness is the byproduct of reasoning well—
of virtuous reasoning. This leads to a second
consideration.
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possible in respect of the natural virtues,
but not in respect of those on the basis
of which a person is said to be really
good; for he will possess all of them as
soon as he acquires the one, practical
wisdom (p. 118).

explanations, and studying the arguments of
one’s instructors. The upshot is that it is
acquired through teaching, not habituation. The
calculative virtues, on the other hand, are more
difficult to restrict to the result of teaching alone.
In brief, the calculative virtues include phronesis
(practical wisdom) and techne (skill). These
virtues “enable one to attain ‘variable’
(contingent) truths that are ‘in agreement with
right desire’” (Battaly, 2006, p. 202). Moreover,
each is acquire via inductive and deductive
teaching. Practical wisdom, for example, is
obtained through listening and considering
lectures about “what is noble and just”
(Aristotle, 2004, p. 6). Thus one learns practical
wisdom via deduction. But induction is also
important. This entails learning through
practice—e.g., practice adjudicating and
considering particulars—which begins to look
very similar to habituation. I consider this point
in more depth in the following chapter.

This is because the complexities of life often
demand we discern a how to act properly. This
interdependence of intellectual and moral virtues
is at the heart of Aristotle’s argument for the
unity of the virtues.
African Concepts of Virtue
There is a vibrant philosophical
community on the African continent. For
example, in A Companion to African
Philosophy, Kwasi Wiredu (2004) assembles an
impressively diverse collection of essays
addressing topics like the philosophy of mind,
history of African philosophy, logic, and moral
philosophy—all from a distinctly African
perspective. But what is African philosophy?
Somewhat simplified, there are presently two
general perspectives on African philosophy—the
traditional and the anti-ethnophilosophical.
According to Wiredu, “Traditionalists have
tended…to restrict the concerns of modern
African philosophy to issues having some
connection with traditional African thought and
culture.” On the other hand, the antiethnophilosophers argue that “the modern world
presents intellectual challenges which may not
all admit of such a derivation, and to abstain
from involvement with them on the grounds of a
non-African origination is unlikely to prove a
blessing to Africa in the modern world” (p. 4).
The division, then, centers on the role of
Western thought. This issue extends beyond the
concerns of this chapter. I would note, however,
that the notion of virtue advanced here draws
from traditional African philosophy.

The moral virtues, as noted above, are
acquired through habituation. “We become
builders by building, and lyre-players by playing
the lyre. So too we become just by doing just
actions, temperate by temperate actions, and
courageous by courageous actions” (Aristotle,
2004, p. 23). In short, we become virtuous by
practicing virtue, which has the clear
implication that the moral upbringing of students
cannot be taught by instruction alone. It requires
that children consistently practice virtuous acts
thereby acquiring truly virtuous character traits.
The matter is complicated, however, by
Aristotle’s claim that one cannot become truly
morally virtuous without the presence of the
intellectual virtue of practical wisdom.
It is clear from what we have said, then,
that we cannot be really good without
practical wisdom, or practically wise
without virtue of character. Moreover,
on these lines one might also meet the
dialectical argument that could be used
to suggest that the virtues exist in
isolation from one another. The same
person, it might be argued, is not best
suited by nature for all the virtues, so
that he will already have acquired one
before he has acquired another. This is

It is also worth noting that the term
African Philosophy is equivalent to using the
term Western philosophy; each encompasses
innumerable philosophical perspectives shaded
by a larger cultural milieu. Sensitive to this, I
have tried to restrict my generalizations to those
made by Africans doing philosophy. There is
123

Ortwein
_____________________________________________________________________________________
important point: “These authors fail to
understand what makes religion important in
African life, namely, the welfare of the
individual and that of society” (Bewaji, 2004, p.
397). African people are not—in the pejorative
sense—so deeply religious as to have no regard
for human welfare outside of religious systems
of thought. Indeed, religion serves as a means of
discharging their responsibilities to maintain
human welfare. Devotion and worship of deities
is performed genuinely, but not for the sake of
the deity. Rather religious worship is offered for
the benefit of society. When a deity fails to serve
(or bless) the interests of the society, people are
free to sever that relationship (Bewaji, p. 399).
In short, African people value human life for its
own sake—not as the product of blind
religiosity.

good reason for this. Africa is in the midst of
crisis of self-determination—the consequence of
having been aggressively colonized for
centuries. It is for those whose lives are tied to
the African continent, whose futures are
(literally) at stake, to generalize about the nature
of that future and self-identity.
Foundations for Moral Thought in Africa
In most African cultures, the foundation
of ethics is twofold: a respect for the individual
appropriately balanced with the needs of the
community. But this is a tenuous balance as
Segun Gbadegesin (1991) notes:
From this it follows that there need not
be any tension between individuality
and community since it is possible for
an individual to freely give up his/her
own perceived interest for the survival
of the community. But in giving up
one’s interests thus, one is also sure that
the community will not disown one and
that one’s well being will be its
concern…. The idea of individual rights,
based on a conception of individuals as
atoms, is therefore bound to be foreign
to this system. For community is
founded on notions of an intrinsic and
enduring relationship among its
members (pp. 66-67).

African Virtue
Bearing these contextualizing remarks
in mind, we can now turn our attention to
African notions of virtue. Kwame Gyekye
(2011) notes, “Good character is the essence of
the African moral system, the linchpin of the
moral wheel” (section. 1). Indeed, he also claims
that:
Many writers have made the observation
that despite the indisputable cultural
diversity that arises from Africa's ethnic
pluralism, there are underlying affinities
in many areas of the African life; this is
surely true in the African religious and
moral outlook. There are some features
of the moral life and thought of various
African societies that…are common or
shared features (section. 2).

To understand the virtues, one first needs to
grasp the interdependent relationship between
the individual and the community, and the
mutual demands engendered by this relationship.
Gbadegesin uses the term survival quite
deliberately; many African communities have
extremely limited access to natural resources.
The individual that fails to grasp her obligations
to community risk expulsion. What, then, is the
character of this bond between the person and
her community? Traditionally, this connection
has been understood as fundamentally rooted in
religion—that is, that the basis for morality is
inextricably tied to the deeply religious nature of
African culture. Several notable African scholars
have propagated this view, including Bolaji
Idowu, John Mbiti, and J. O. Awolala.
Unfortunately, this view also misses an

Following Gyekye’s assertion that “good
character” is the basis for moral reasoning in
African society, I examine the two largest ethnic
populations in Western Africa—the Yoruba and
Akan people.
Bewaji notes that the Yoruba hold to a
set of pervasive ethical norms that regulate the
behavior of both persons and the gods. Those
who live uprightly—whose character exhibit
virtue with respect to themselves, tribal elders,
and others in general are variously called oniwa
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The various societies found in
traditional Africa routinely accept this
fact that personhood is the sort of thing
which has to be attained, and is attained
in direct proportion as one participates
in communal life through the discharge
of the various obligations defined by
one's stations. It is the carrying out of
these obligations that transforms one
from the it-status of early child-hood,
marked by an absence of moral
function, into the person-status of later
years, marked by a widened maturity of
ethical sense—an ethical maturity
without which personhood is conceived
as eluding one (p. 176).

rere, oniwa tutu, and Omoluwabi (Bewaji, 2004,
399). These terms denote persons that are
esteemed in their respective societies for their
virtuous character. Bolatito Lanre-Abass (2008)
highlights six core virtues in Yoruba society.
These include integrity (iwa), justice (iwa eto),
trust (igbagbo), accountability (akoyawo),
sensitivity (iyara ni imo), and service (ise
iranse) (p. 132). The importance of cultivating
such virtues is caught up in the Yoruba proverb,
“The adornment of a smile is white teeth; the
adornment of a person is good character”
(Owomoyela, 2005, p. 268). Such proverbs are
illustrative: they succinctly encapsulate the
rooted cultural wisdom about the importance of
virtue. As noted above, Africa societies
emphasize the individual’s responsibility to the
community and vice versa; the Yoruba are no
different. The good or virtuous community
member values and speaks highly of her town.
“Whoever says the town is not pleasant should
pack his or her luggage and head for the bush”
(Owomoyela, p. 314). Indeed, numerous
proverbs recommend that loyal community
members should be recognized and rewarded for
their faithfulness to community.

According to Menkiti we begin our life-journey
with it-status—that is, without a secure identity.
Over time, however, through responsible
participation in the life of the community we
obtain person-status. D. A. Masolo (2004)
argues that personhood is actually “attained
through an educational process that intensifies at
every stage in one’s growth and development”
(p. 491). He offers the example of message
carrying. Children in many African communities
are tasked with carrying message from one
person to another. While seemingly innocuous,
such task are designed to train children “in the
virtue of obedience and serve to others while
also bring them to the knowledge of close and
distant relatives, an obvious attempt to fit
children into the larger social system…”
(Masolo, p. 492). As children mature into
adolescence and then to adulthood, their social
obligations increase (as does their status as
persons). Ideally, their character develops in
similar proportion. Of course, both good and bad
character traits may emerge. One Akan proverb
states that “one is not born with a bad head, but
one takes it on from the earth” (Gyekye, 2011,
section 3). In short, persons are not born with
intrinsic character traits and habits, but obtain
them through time, training, and experience.

The Akan people of Western Africa
echo similar sentiments. “When virtue founds a
town, the town thrives and abides.” The Akan
link the success of a town to its character—or
rather, the character of its people. This reiterates
the social nature of African moral thought and
central place of character. Indeed, individual
happiness is only achieved when one is in right
standing with his fellows: “The well-being of
man depends on his fellow man” (Gyekye, 2011,
section 8). Among the several virtues valued by
the Akan are goodwill, sympathy, compassion,
and altruism. But this raises another question:
How are the virtues acquired or learned?
Education: Personhood and the Acquisition
of Virtuous Character
Becoming virtuous is an ongoing
process social education in which persons
continually evolve. In fact, the relationship
between character and education is the basis for
understanding personhood in African thought.
Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) explains:
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With respect to the virtues of character,
Aristotle argued that they are obtained through
habituation and practice. This insight is echoed
in African moral thought. Children are given
multi-layered tasks that develop character, and
initiate them into to the larger community. The
latter is intended to cultivate a concern for the
wellbeing of the community at large. This is a
form of habituation, or learning by practice and
repetition, and a feature that African societies
share with the other traditions discussed. The
rigorous memory training undergone by
Buddhist monks, for example, teaches diligence,
conscientiousness and carefulness (recall, they
must inflect perfectly). Furthermore,
Confucians, Buddhists, and Aristotelians share a
regard for rules and/or precepts. These do not
replace the cultivation of virtue. Rather, they
provide a framework that enables persons to
mature into virtue.

Some Points of Contact and Divergence
It goes without saying that the
intellectual traditions discussed are radically
different in many ways: their religions, cultural
customs and traditions, even their moral
practices and laws. Certain Asian cultures, for
example, believe it is perfectly ordinary and
unproblematic to give monetary gifts to potential
clients in order to gain their business. In the
United States such practices are illegal.
Likewise, the sacrifice of animals is an act of
worship for many cultures, but a cause for horror
in many European cultures. This highlights the
fact that, although two cultures may value
similar virtues, the manner in which these
virtues shape customs and practices leaves a lot
of room for difference. Let us consider some of
these similarities and differences.
The Confucian notion of Ren—the sum
total of virtues leading to compassion—is a
crucial component of Confucian ethics. Both
Buddhist and African traditions also have place
great emphasis on an empathetic stance toward
others. Indeed, the stability of African
communities hinges on a concern for the
wellbeing of other members of the community.
Although Aristotle was primarily concerned
with individual happiness, he also believed that
those who were virtuous would display attitudes
of friendliness, generosity, and justice.

A devotion to community is a central
feature of many African societies. Indeed, one’s
personhood hinges on maturing into a
responsible (virtuous) adult. For the Yoruba this
involves cultivating integrity, justice,
trustworthiness, accountability, sensitivity, and
service. These community-directed virtues are
echoed in each of the traditions considered. This
is evident in Confucian idea of ren—of
becoming “near to humanity” (Confucius, 2010,
bk 1, chap. 14). The person who has ren has a
deep concern for other members of the
community. Buddhists also practice communitydirected virtues. For example, the custom of
giving is an ancient practice intended bring the
negative craving for personal possessions under
control, but it is also practiced for the sake of the
wellbeing and unity of the community (Olson,
2005, p. 104). Finally, in a passage on the virtue
of friendship, Aristotle (2004) states clearly that
a concern for community is tied a person’s
honor: “The person who contributes nothing to
the community is not honored, since what is
common is given to the person who benefits the
community, and honor is something common”
(p. 163).

Buddhism’s emphasis on enlightenment
is founded on controlling and modifying one’s
cognitive life. A similar thrust is evident in
Confucianism’s emphasis on the importance of
education. Recall that Confucius (2010) believed
a love of knowledge central to the acquisition of
virtue. In fact, he believed that one would
become vicious without knowledge (bk 14,
chap. 42). This partially explains why both
traditions emphasize diligence and hard work
with respect to learning. Aristotle also stressed
the importance of the cognitive life, believing
that our most basic function is reason. Those
who reason well embody the virtues. They also
experience happiness and Aristotle (2004) tells
us “happiness, therefore, will be some form of
contemplation” (p. 198).

Clearly positive accounts of virtue a
present in each of the traditions considered. In
this respect, the concept of virtue putatively
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and conduct. The Moslem [sic]
shopkeeper down the road has different
beliefs from me, but I am well able to
appreciate his honesty, integrity,
courage and industry; on the other hand,
I may have no trouble recognizing the
racist bigots who persecute him—albeit
in the name of my own culture—for the
liars and cowards that they are. It is also
clearly important that some such crosscultural criteria of moral value are
recognizable if there is to be the
possibility of holding some cultures to
moral account precisely for their
injustice, mendacity, intemperateness or
cruelty. From this viewpoint, it seems a
mistake to index virtues to rival moral
traditions in the manner of some recent
neo-idealist moral and social theories—
for the language of virtue is arguably the
cross-cultural ethical currency of
humankind (p. 231).

transcends cultural “borders” and religious
traditions. But this does not diminish the fact
that cultures also differ in terms of the virtues.
Martin and Seligman (2004) conducted a survey
of 15,000 persons from numerous distinct
cultural contexts, and undertook a large-scale
historical survey of ancient traditions to
determine how virtues function in multiple
contexts. They found that, despite these
variations, six core virtues were present in every
cultural context:
When data collection was complete,
analysis involved condensing each list
by locating thematically similar virtues
and classifying them under an obviously
emerging core virtue. By that term, we
mean an abstract ideal encompassing a
number of other, more specific virtues
that reliably converge to the
recognizable higher-order category (p.
35).
These higher-order categories included: wisdom,
courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and
transcendence. Twenty-four additional and more
specific virtues were then categorized under
each of these headings. Here there was a greater
degree of variety between cultures. It is also
important to note that these higher-order virtues
did not share a one-to-one relationship across
cultures.

The evidence presented thus far suggests that
Carr is correct; talk of courage, honesty, and
justice are not foreign concepts to those of
diverse backgrounds. Carr does not mention,
however, that the cross-cultural “language of
virtue” is predicated on a disposition and
willingness to communicate. I suggest, then, that
certain character traits are crucial if cultural
exchange and understanding is to be achieved.
An individual and society should be openminded and epistemically humble. An openminded person or society is receptive to other
ideas and customs; it values and thus strives to
understand others. In short, such persons (and
cultures) begin with the presupposition that what
we know and understand about other people
groups is potentially wrong-headed, limited, or
misguided.

While much more research should be
done on the topic discussed in this paper, I one
particularly powerful observation should be
made about cross-cultural communication.
Virtue—or more precisely—virtuous
communication might aid in ameliorating
cultural misapprehensions, misunderstandings,
and in extreme cases--xenophobia. David Carr
(2003) has pointed out that the strength of virtue
theories is that the language it employs cuts
across cultural divides:
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